The U.S. Air Force (USAF) uses the term Communication Navigation Surveillance / Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) for capabilities that allow its aircraft to use civil airspace and air traffic control services. The resulting ability to interoperate with air traffic control systems around the world supports the USAF's global, multi-faceted mission, but entails great expense in on-board equipage and training. It is important to understand the trade-offs that the USAF must make in assessing the value of specific CNS/ATM capabilities. In this paper, we describe a model-driven analysis to assess mission effectiveness. The analysis is accomplished via a five-step process involving military route generation, simulation of the civilian airspace activity, simulation of delay events for military flights, and evaluation of several figures of merit. The software modules used for these activities were a combination of existing packages and some newly-developed programs. The analysis accounts for planned USAF CNS/ATM capabilities by aircraft type, as well as any airspace and operational restrictions that might be encountered in specific geographic regions when the aircraft does not have the required capabilities. Two layers of interactions are investigated: first, within the USAF enterprise, specifically, between the fighter and tankers assets and, second, between the USAF and civilian ATM.
Introduction
The success of the U.S. Air Force in the international arena hinges on the ability to access civilian airspace in a wide array of sovereign polities. Onboard aircraft equipage determines the level of air traffic control services and access to airspace -in general, the better the equipage, the better the service and access. The term Communication Navigation Surveillance / Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) is used to refer to these avionic capabilities. It is not cost effective for the USAF simply to equip every aircraft with the best-available avionics. Rather, a trade-off analysis emerges: what level of spending for upgrades coincides with a given level of performance? For the study at hand, a specific question is posed: What is the degradation in mission effectiveness, assuming delays in planned avionics upgrades, in light of current and continuing denial of military-preferred routings and altitudes in civil European airspace? Lacking access to the best routes and altitudes, military aircraft are subject to increased mixing with the civil fleet, and may suffer congestion delay. We modeled this phenomenon for two future years by using a sector workload model, and assigning delay (selected at random from an empirical distribution) when a military flight encounters a busy sector. In addition, we apply Monte Carlo sampling to represent the vagaries of weather and airborne refueling delay.
Two hypothetical scenarios are considered, with different forward basing of fighters. In one scenario, it is assumed that, due to operational and diplomatic reasons, USAF fighters must be based in the United Kingdom. In the other scenario, USAF fighters are based at various USAF bases on the continent. For each scenario, cases where military aircraft were "CNS equipped" (enabled to meet CNS requirements to the extent possible) and "CNS non-equipped" (lacking on one or more CNS capabilities) were examined. A strike package, consisting of fighters, bombers, specialty aircraft, and tankers, attempts to rendezvous in prospect of a bombing mission on a Southwest Asia (SWA) target. Mission effectiveness is measured in several ways: ops tempo (missions per unit time), probability of strike package formation, and possible resultant re-planning if the package never forms. These metrics allow a richness of trade-off results. Nominal departure times allow the possibility that en route delay will cause the assigned time-on-target to be missed. But early departure times may engender loitering by the early-arriving assets, implying wasted resources (e.g., crew and fuel), and reduced ops tempo. We summarize the trade-offs, and also present results for the effect of missed packages on the Air Operations Center (AOC) and tanker utilization.
Background
On April 3, 1996 an Air Force CT-43 (the military version of the Boeing 737) crashed in bad weather while attempting a landing at Dubrovnik, Croatia -killing 35 people including the U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ronald H. Brown and a trade delegation of a dozen U.S. business executives. About two months later, Cable Network News (CNN) reported that an Air Force investigation had found poor navigation equipment was partly to blame for the incident [1] , [2] .
As a direct result of this event, the Secretary of Defense mandated enhancements to navigation safety for U. S. military aircraft -conformance to civil CNS/ATM standards. Motivated by recent queries from the Air Force Electronic Systems Command and from others in the DoD CNS/ATM community, the authors undertook a CNS/ATM impact analysis.
To the knowledge of the authors, few previous studies similar to this one are in the open literature. A number of papers on the general topic of "forward basing" can be found at [3] . A study by RAND [4] looks at USAF basing "in theatre", and explores a number of issues associated with demand for assets and global access. The paper looks at operational and political considerations under conditions of battle as well as the growing area of "military operations other than war" -peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. A study by MITRE [5] describes a model which relates air traffic control events such as take-off, airborne maneuver, and taxi-in, to CNS demand. That study pertains to the National Airspace System in the United States, whereas the study at hand considers Europe and Southwest Asia, in which the variety of countries' airspace rules creates a need for more elaborate scenarios.
Goals of the Research
The goals of the study were to identify impacts resulting from non-compliance with CNS/ATM regulations. These impacts were either operational/cost or safety. In discussions with the user community, including former and current military pilots and military air traffic controllers, we determined that looking at operational impacts would carry the greatest weight with focus on war-fighters accomplishing war-time missions. Operational impacts can often be overcome by spending additional money (e.g., for more fuel or more shifts of personnel to accomplish work-arounds), but we did not attempt to quantify such costs.
Our modeling goals were as follows:
• Look at specific CNS/ATM capabilities and specific platforms, using the platform-by-platform schedule of implementing these capabilities provided by the Global Access Navigation/Safety CNS/ATM Roadmap for the 2010 and 2015 timeframes; • Focus on EUROCONTROL airspace as one of the most congested, tightly regulated regions in the world, and its vanguard position in traffic and regulation trends; • Investigate civilian-military interaction, specifically how military flights interact with civilian ATM authorities while transiting civilian airspace en route to operational areas; and • Investigate Air Combat Command fighter interactions with Air Mobility Command tankers; specifically, how refueling operations are impacted by mixed CNS capabilities.
To accomplish these project goals, an analysis team was assembled from MITRE staff specializing in military and aviation subject areas.
Assumptions and Problem Definition
We reviewed policy related to CNS/ATM capabilities vis-à-vis the USAF use of European airspace for military operations over the coming years. Based on this review, assumptions were developed and a hypothesis was generated to direct the analysis. The assumptions are as follows:
• Traffic will increase. EUROCONTROL forecasts indicate that levels of air traffic will continue to increase over the coming years [6] . By 2010, overall European air traffic is projected to grow 26%; by 2015 -60%; • Political considerations will lead to an increasingly regulated environment. Both on the ground and in the air, additional regulations will constrain military air operations. On the ground, airfields near potential conflict areas may deny basing to certain types of military aircraft, perhaps forcing them to remote bases. In the air, diplomatic waivers which today provide airspace for aircraft with lower CNS capabilities will be more difficult or impossible to obtain. In today's environment, lower-CNS-equipped flights are accommodated through corridors called Altitude Reservations or ALTRVs. However, in the future, political and economic considerations suggest that ALTRVs will be more difficult or impossible to obtain; • Initiatives such as Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) and Single European Sky (SES) will further constrain military operations. These EUROCONTROL and European Union initiatives will further restrict routing options by (1) limiting the availability of Special Use Airspace (SUA) for military operations, and (2) rendering ALTRVs even more difficult to coordinate and reserve; and • All civil aircraft will be highly CNS equipped. Since commercial air carriers benefit financially from being granted the best routes, it is assumed that they will invest in the more robust CNS capabilities. Non-scheduled civil flights are assumed to continue to utilize current routes and altitudes.
As a result of these factors, military aircraft will be increasingly required to (1) fly within congested civilian traffic sectors and/or (2) accept less efficient (lower altitudes or longer routes) to mission operations areas. It follows naturally that military aircraft with higher CNS capabilities will realize benefits from being cleared for more favorable routes of flight. For aircraft with fewer CNS capabilities, uncertainty regarding en route treatment by civil air traffic controllers will result in work-arounds and additional contingency planning. Pilots will plan enough time to address worst-case scenarios. As a result, inefficiencies will be inherent in mission plans and in transit routing. As a shorthand convention, for the remainder of this paper, the terms "equipped" and "CNS equipped" will mean "enabled to meet the CNS requirements established for the airspace in which the aircraft normally flies." The terms "unequipped", "non-equipped", or "non-CNS-equipped" will mean that the aircraft's CNS/ATM capabilities do not meet the civil airspace requirements where it normally flies.
The analysis presented tested several interrelated hypotheses. Overall, military aircraft with a larger set of CNS capabilities are hypothesized to improve mission efficiency for the USAF enterprise (including Combat Air Force, Mobility Air Force, and AOC) in an environment that requires use of airspace managed by civilian ATM. More specifically, CNS-equipped aircraft may reduce the transit time through civilian-managed airspace and may also reduce the variability in the time of arrival of aircraft in strike packages, resulting in less waiting at the package formation point. This would in turn raise the operations tempo (ops tempo) of the fleet and result in more efficient use of resources, e.g., crews and tankers. In addition, less re-planning of missions due to late arrivals may be required, leaving dynamic planning resources available to address time-sensitive targeting opportunities in the AOC.
The approach for testing these hypotheses was the execution of a "federation of models". These models are described in more detail in the Analysis section below. Since there are differing requirements for representing differing elements in a simulation context, several modeling capabilities were brought together. Specifically, there are requirements to:
• Model the flight-planning of military flights from forward base to target area • Model civilian air traffic and the associated congestion • Model the interaction of many military missions through a day of civilian traffic • Model the desired output metrics: ops temp, arrival times, re-planning rate, fuel burn
Civilian Environment and Military Avionics Roadmap
While there are over two dozen types and levels of CNS/ATM and safety capabilities installed or planned on USAF aircraft, four have received the most attention because of civil aviation authority mandates in Europe, including: The lack of any of these four capabilities could potentially have adverse impacts for aircraft that fly over Europe. Our approach was to consider which capabilities are planned for installation by 2010 and 2015 in the aircraft that are part of the strike package in the scenarios developed. These dates are beyond the deadlines when the capabilities are required in Europe but within the period during which many USAF aircraft will still lack the capabilities. The basis for this information was a set of CNS/ATM Roadmaps, which are updated twice a year by the Air Force.
For analysis in this paper, 8.33 kHz radios on fighters and FM Immunity on B52 were chosen as the CNS/ATM capabilities for study. The B-52 is a legacy program of long standing -the aircraft continues to be "workhorse" for the USAF. It is projected for continuing use into the timeframes examined in this paper. It's of particular interest because the integration costs for the B-52 are especially high owing to its legacy stature and systems. The simulations were run with and without these capabilities onboard, in order to assess the impacts.
Scenario Development
The application of simulation modeling requires a specific scenario in which to represent assumptions and test hypotheses. Global strike (stealth fighter attack missions) and global mobility (humanitarian missions) concepts were considered before focusing on the global response concept. In a global response concept, Combat Air Force assets are deployed from U.S. bases to forward operating locations for employment in the operational area. The global response concept fits well with our impact analysis needs, because of the mix of platforms and the inherent interaction between Combat Air Force and Mobility Air Force. The Air Combat Command from Langley Air Force Base [7] kindly provided an unclassified deploy/employ scenario that identified numbers and types of Combat Air Force platforms as well as basing at the appropriate forward operating locations. Note for this impact analysis study, only the employment phase (forward base to target) was considered. Using the Air Combat Command-supplied numbers and types of aircraft, the simulation scenario could be laid out in detail. By 2010, four aircraft types were identified that would be affected by the lack of key CNS/ATM capabilities: the bomber B-52 and the fighters F-15, and F-16. The B-52 bomber was projected to lack FM Immunity and the fighters were projected to lack 8.33 Communications. Both FM Immunity and 8.33 Communications are required throughout European high-altitude airspace Scenario 1 was selected as the worst case due to diplomatic and operational considerations; all fighters are based in the United Kingdom. Scenario 2 has the fighters coming from the Air Combat Command -provided bases in Italy, Macedonia, and Hungary, all of which are very close to the edge of the 8.33 and FM Immunity capability area. In both scenarios, the B-52 is based in the United Kingdom.
Within each of the two scenarios, cases were analyzed for equipped and non-equipped aircraft. It is assumed that military flights can gain diplomatic approval to overfly all countries on the European continent. The main contrast is therefore the air traffic control service impacting flight time and distance -in general, better equipped aircraft fly higher and faster.
The routes for the equipped and non-equipped fighter cases follow from the 8.33 communications and RVSM regulations: 8.33 equipped aircraft can fly up to Flight Level 290 (RVSM constraint) and the 8.33 non-equipped aircraft must fly below Flight Level 195. The route for the equipped and non-equipped bomber cases follow from FM Immunity -the equipped route is optimally through the FM Immunity area and the nonequipped route is around the FM Immunity area, essentially a circumnavigation of the Iberian Peninsula. The non-equipped B-52 bomber route is around the FM Immunity airspace in both scenarios (bases in the UK and Eastern Europe). A large target, such as an airfield, was selected in SWA with a package formation or marshalling point just off the west coast of Syria in the Mediterranean Sea. For this target, one B-52, six F-15s, four F-16s were deployed with the fighters flying in formation. In addition, specialty aircraft (E-3, E-8, RC-135) and tankers (KC-135) were also a notional part of the analysis but were not directly included.
An unclassified Air Tasking Order (ATO), similar to the first day of the Desert Storm campaign in 1991, was used to complete the scenario. It was generated using the campaign model Thunder [8] . This ATO contained 446 missions. This mission planning, combined with an assumption of a strike-package of 11 flights (one bomber and 10 fighters, not counting tankers or specialty aircraft) yielded the necessary detail for the simulation modeling. The file of 446 missions, a full day of military activity in the intense early days of a campaign, was divided into 4 time periods corresponding to waves of significant activity. Although this type of military action is infrequent, the notion of military preparedness suggests that assets be available to carry it out as necessary, at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief.
Analysis Process
The analysis of the two scenarios was identical and was performed in five steps:
1. Military routes were generated; 2. Military routes were overlaid on civilian air traffic and the flight time was simulated; 3. Distributions for the estimated time of arrival for each aircraft was determined by introducing variability with respect to congestion, refueling time, and weather; 4. The estimated time of arrival for each aircraft or formation was used to estimate the average time for package formation; and 5. The effect of missed packages on the AOC was determined. These five steps are described in detail in the following subsections of the paper. Figure 1 is a schematic of these steps, naming the tools employed plus the information inputs and outputs.
1 Analysis Step 1: Military Route Generation
The first step in the analysis process was to plan detailed flight paths for each of the aircraft in the defined strike package. Example routes were obtained from the Global Decision Support System database that the Air Force Research Laboratory maintains, which contains global military flight plans in civilian airspace. The Global Decision Support System routes were altered based on constraints imposed by the presence or absence of particular capabilities. Two routes were planned for each aircraft: routes based on operational work-arounds resulting from CNS/ATM capability shortfalls and routes based on full capability.
A software package called Portable Flight Planning Software (PFPS) [9] was used to design the routes for this analysis. PFPS is a suite of software tools running on a Microsoft Windows platform and is part of the Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS) [9] . PFPS provides a set of common aviation planning tools that support a broad range of mission planning needs and operational environments. The system is equipped of supporting planning for the following missions: air-to-air, air-to-ground, air refueling, electronic combat, reconnaissance, special operations, conventional gravity weapon release, airlift, and rescue.
For this analysis, two components of PFPS were used: Combat Flight Planning System (CFPS) and FalconView [9] . CFPS provided extensive route editing and planning functions, a set of detailed flight dynamics models for military aircraft, and access to the Digital Aeronautical Flight Information File (DAFIF) navigation database. FalconView provided a map-based graphical user interface, overlay and display capabilities, and dragand-drop editing. The routes designed can be exported in either a native binary format or an XML-based format. The routes selected represent preferred routing, in which a direct great circle path from the take off point to the destination is used. In all cases, our destination was the marshalling point, at an air navigation waypoint in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The aircraft were assumed to depart from various locations as detailed in the Scenario Development section above. For the cases that assumed full capability, the routes were created at nominal altitudes and airspeed (as suggested by the planning tools). In the cases where the fighters were assumed to lack the required 8.33 communications equipment, the aircraft were required to fly at a lower altitude but were allowed to ascend to a better altitude once they left the 8.33-restricted area. The specific flight levels used in the analysis are listed in Table 1 . In the case where the B-52 lacked FM Immunity capability, the aircraft was allowed to depart the UK, but had to immediately leave the FM Immunity-restricted area and circumnavigate the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal), enter the Mediterranean Sea through the Straits of Gibraltar, and fly over water to the marshalling point. The route paths for Scenario 2 are shown in Figure 2 . Scenario 
Figure 1: Steps of Analysis and Tools (shown in rectangles) Used In This Study
These routes were sufficiently long that, in most cases, the fighter aircraft did not have sufficient range to fly from takeoff to the marshalling point without refueling. The lone exception was the F-15 in Scenario 2, which was based sufficiently close to the area of operation that no en route refueling was necessary. Air refueling tracks were assumed available as needed. Note that all aircraft are refueled at the marshalling point before the actual strike is undertaken, including loitering aircraft if applicable (e.g., package formation delayed).
The en route fixed air refueling was modeled by having the aircraft fly to a pre-defined waypoint where a tanker aircraft was available. At this point, the fighter descended to FL250 (unless it was already flying at a low altitude because it was not equipped with 8.33 kHz communications capabilities , in which case it maintained its lower altitude). The fighter then entered a loitering orbit for a fixed amount of time. Based on conversations with subject matter experts [10] , it was assumed that a four-flight formation would require an average of 60 minutes (with minimum and maximum at ± 15 minutes) to refuel and a two-flight formation would require an average of 30 minutes (with a minimum and maximum at ± 10 minutes) for refueling.
Figure 2: Routes for Scenario 2 -Southern/Eastern European-Based Fighters
In Scenario 2, a "fighter drag" case was modeled in which the fighters were accompanied by a KC-10 tanker, which compensates for the 8.33 communications capability shortfall e.g., the tanker is equipped and its CNS capabilities are utilized to lead the aircraft formation. In this case, the refueling is accomplished in a moving track while continuing to make forward progress towards the destination. In order to accomplish refueling in this fashion, the aircraft must slow to 310 knots (nautical miles per hour) true airspeed for the duration of the refueling operation. Military flight route definitions were exported for use in Step 2, as described below.
2 Analysis Step 2: Military Routes in Civilian Traffic and Estimation of Flying Times
The Center for Advanced Aviation System Development (CAASD) Analysis Platform for En Route (CAPER) was used as a simulation platform to model the civilian traffic and military flights in order to estimate flying times for the mission. CAPER [11] is a modeling and analysis capability derived from a tool which was used for development of new flow control concepts for the Federal Aviation Administration. It consists of a playback mode which accepts flight plan and flight target progress reports, allowing detailed post-hoc analysis of a situation. Alternately it can be used in a "what-if" mode for flow control planning and impact analysis. It contains an aircraft flight module which realistically models: take-off, climb, cruise, descent, and landing, per nominal aircraft performance specifications. The system has been tested for reasonableness, and been in use for 5 years. Some of CAPER capabilities include:
• Visualization of current and future traffic flows and sector loading; • Identification of flights that are expected to be directly impacted by the situation;
• Defining candidate re-routes to alleviate the situation; and • Analyzing the impact of a reroute strategy on sector loading for all the sectors.
CAPER was originally developed to work within the confines of the Continental United States (CONUS), and in order to use CAPER for this analysis, CAASD obtained and modeled the following data for the European airspace and flight operations:
• Actual European traffic data;
• Commercial airline schedule data from the Official Airline Guide (OAG);
• European adaptation data, e.g., fixes, airways, sector definitions, and Geopolitical boundaries; and • Wind data, for accurate trajectory modeling.
To simulate an accurate representation of the European civilian traffic, MITRE contracted with an Italian company [12] to generate the flight plan data for 3 specific days in June 2005. The data that was generated took into account the actual routes that were previously flown between individual city pairs as well as restricted airspace. This combination of input provided a realistic scenario of the civilian air operations on those days. Additionally, CAASD used actual European traffic data obtained from EUROCONTROL for the same days to validate the data generated by A.S.A. Srl. CAASD also extracted additional information from the EUROCONTROL data, which included non-scheduled traffic (called "General Aviation" in the United States). Military traffic data from the FalconView flight planning system was also added. CAASD obtained the necessary adaptation data including sector definition data in order to accurately count aircraft traversing individual sectors and to compute sector capacities [13] .
Using EUROCONTROL growth estimates [6] , civilian traffic was increased to approximate 2010 and 2015 levels. For this projection process, no new
Figure 3: CAPER Traffic Display for Europe (© 2006 IEEE)
routes were created -the existing flight database was sampled to generate the new traffic, with some time biasing, so that take-off times were not coincidental between the new, future flight, and the existing, sampled flight. Specifically, 4 regions were identified for purposes of applying growth estimates: 3 in Europe and one international. (East Europe, as an example, had a higher growth estimate than Western Europe, since it has historically had less economic development, and so a greater potential for growth, expressed as %, was plausible). Growth factors were available for each inter-and intraregion pair. For example, there was a growth factor for Western Europe to/from international, and a growth factor for intra-Western Europe. Randomized sampling. against the current-day flight data was guided by these factors to yield 2010 and 2015 traffic sets.
The complete scenario, including flight plans and aircraft position reports for both civilian and military flights, wind data, and adaptation data were then modeled by CAPER for a 24-hour period, resulting in 4-D trajectories for all aircraft flying during that period. (The four dimensions are: [x,y,z,t] or latitude, longitude, altitude, and time.) The key outputs from this step were the expected time of arrival for each of the USAF aircraft in the military scenarios. Figure 3 [14] depicts, for a single point in time, the CAPER traffic display with all airborne civilian aircraft depicted. This particular example demonstrates the CAPER future traffic display feature, which allows the user to project the traffic to the future. As a zoom-in to an area of interest, Figure 4 shows military routes overlaying the civilian traffic. The rectangular loops on the military routes are the holding patterns where refueling takes place.
Figure 4: Military Routes Overlaid on Civilian Traffic

Analysis Step 3: Generating Distributions of ETA
The times of arrival for each formation obtained from CAPER were run through a Monte Carlo process. This was a simple special-purpose computer program set up to draw from probability distributions and alter flying times. The nominal modeled time of arrival was varied randomly by sampling from distributions of delay times for civilian air traffic congestion, refueling time, and en route weather.
The distribution for civilian air traffic congestion was formulated offline by several team members playing the role of traffic managers, and rerouting traffic around sectors using the CAPER dynamic rerouting capability. A sample of about 30 reroutes were performed, and those 30 observations (additional flying times) were fit to a triangular distribution. In the Monte Carlo process, the times/places of civilian congestion were modeled, using equations from [13] , and compared to the nominal military flights' sector penetration times. When the two coincided, a randomized draw was made from the distribution, to simulate the additional time associated with the military flight being rerouted around a congested sector.
The refueling delays were also modeled as triangular distributions, using the mean times per subject matter experts, and then assuming ± 10 minutes as a range around the 30-minute-mean distribution, and ± 15 minutes range around the 60-minute-mean distribution. For the (assumed triangular) distribution of delay associated with severe en route weather, arrival delay data from a bad weather day in the U.S. were used. The data was taken from flights with a distance comparable to the U.K. to Syria distance used in Scenario 1.
Triangular distributions were used as an expedient, since it was reasonable that a central probability mass existed between two diminishing-probability tails. Though expedient, a major shortcoming of the triangular distribution is the lack of asymptotic behavior at the extremes of the distribution. This would have the effect of the Monte Carlo sampling not generating occasional very high or very low values. In follow-on research, the triangular distributions were replaced by more appropriate exponential distributions.
For sufficient representation of the variability, 100 realizations were created for each of the 446 missions, multiplied by 11 flights per mission. One hundred realizations was considered sufficiently large since in statistics, the critical values for a t-distribution (small sample size adjustment for the problem of estimating a mean from normal data) become nearly indistinguishable from those of the normal distribution at about n=30. This data was further processed, as described in the next section, to generate strike package formation estimates.
4 Analysis Step 4: Estimating Package Formation Times
The estimated distributions for time of arrival at marshalling point obtained for each aircraft formation (formations of aircraft were treated as a single distribution) were used to determine the delay in overall package formation time. The arrival distributions for the four aircraft types, B-52, F-15s, and F-16s, were approximately aligned by selecting appropriate take-off times, so that the tails on the right-hand side of the distributions coincided with the mission's time-on-target per the ATO. The take-off times were parameterized to vary the number of missed packages. A Monte Carlo process was used to calculate random time of arrival based on the four distributions. From this, the average time of waiting for the last set of aircraft to arrive, the event "package formation complete", was calculated.
Analysis Step 5: Effect of Missed Strike Packages on Air Operations Center Performance
An analysis was performed to determine the effect of missed packages on the Air Operations Center (AOC) in terms of critical event response time and increase in required personnel. A detailed model of the operational architecture of the AOC was used for this analysis. The model was developed using the MITRE-MSIM tool, a simulation tool used in modeling the performance of distributed architectural systems. Using MSIM, we graphically specified the architecture of the AOC using a Colored Petri Net. For this model specification and work-load scenario, MSIM produced performance metrics such as component utilization, component throughput, and thread response time. This AOC operational model was based on staffing levels taken from an unclassified 2001 AOC Manpower Reduction Study [15] .
The input to the model included six different types of events: Theatre Ballistic Missile launch and detection, Combat Search and Rescue (a "pilot down" situation), Surface to Air Missile Radiate, Choke Point, and ATO re-tasking. The ATO re-tasking event represents missed packages that were caused by delays resulting from CNS non-equipage issues. All events were given the same priority with the exception of a Combat Search and Rescue event, which was given a higher priority. The effect of this was that the higher priority event preempted work on any other event type. These decisions were made based on conversations with subject matter experts who had worked in an operational AOC and had observed current exercises of new equipment and procedures being developed for the AOC.
Results
Final results for this study are presented here, in terms of times of arrival for equipped vs. non-equipped scenarios, strike package formation time, the effect of missed packages on AOC, and fuel utilization between equipped and non-equipped packages.
1 Arrival Times
The time of arrival distributions for the equipped and non-equipped F-15 aircraft are shown in Figure 5 for the UK bases in both the 2010 and 2015 time frames. The fourth time period is shown since the congestion was highest during this period. We conjectured that the CNS equipped aircraft arrive faster. The following null hypothesis was constructed:
H 0 : XBAR Unequipped = XBAR Equipped where: XBAR is the sample mean At this time of day the spread in the time of arrival distributions is also lower for the CNS equipped aircraft in both the 2010 and 2015 time frames. In the 2010 results using a t-test [16] , the means from the equipped alternatives at each time period are significantly different from the corresponding non-equipped alternative at the α=0.0001 level. The closest means are at the second and third time periods and in both cases the equipped alternative is 58 minutes faster than the non-equipped alternative at α=0.0001 level. The same levels of significance are supported in the 2015 results.
The mission times for the equipped, non-equipped, and drag are shown in Figure 6 for four different base locations. The left-most light gray bar is the average time of arrival from the Monte Carlo-modeled distributions as shown in Figure 5 . A "barbell" symboltwo unshaded circles connected by a line segment, shows two standard deviations around the means of the distributions. Similarly, the right-most dark gray bar is the average return flight time on the same path. The second bar from the right (black in color) is the time to get from the package formation point to the target as well as the time to carry out the mission -this is assumed constant in this analyses. The second bar from the left (white, or unshaded in color) indicates the package formation time. This value was determined using the distributions for the bomber and 3 fighter formations to estimate an average time for package formation. The figure shows the effect of base location on the mission time and relative sortie rate for the CNS equipped and non-equipped packages, as well as the non-equipped drag for the bases in Southern/Eastern Europe. The bases in Southern/Eastern Europe show a relatively small (0-4% difference in sortie rate) effect since those locations are on the edge of the 8.33 area (map in Figure 6 ). The bases in the UK indicate the largest (15% difference in sortie rate) effect, in which all aircraft fly from the UK to a target in SWA. The results of this study can be used to determine the impacts of CNS/ATM shortfalls on mission sortie rates given a forward basing location in Europe. However even in the small-difference sortie rates the total flight time for the equipped alternatives are significantly different from the non-equipped alternatives at the α=0.0001 level. For example the closest means are the equipped Macedonia based fighter is 17 minutes faster than the non-equipped alternative at the α=0.0001 significance level. Even though it is a statistically significant difference, it is not a very large value for a flight time as short as this.
Regarding differences in variability, for the fourth period in the day, the standard deviation in the time of arrival distributions is also lower for the CNS equipped aircraft in both the 2010 and 2015 time frames. However, using an F-test, only in this one time period does the equipped alternative have a statistically significantly lower variance than the non-equipped alternative, at the α=0.0001 level. The other time periods do not have significantly different variances even at the α=0.05 level. These results align with our conjecture for CNS equipped aircraft arriving faster and with less variability in the time of arrival distributions, but it is only true for the period of the day when there is the most congestion. It was initially thought that the variability in arrival times for the B-52 and three fighter packages, (the leftmost "two-circles with connecting line segment" symbol along), would cause a trade-off between AOC response time and sortie rate. However, the degree of variability, less than 1 hour, turned out to be too small with respect to the overall time of flight (~7 hours from the UK) to affect sortie rate to any large extent. Hence, a pilot can merely leave a little earlier to minimize the effect on the AOC and not affect the sortie rate to any measurable amount in sortie rate reduction.
2 Response Time for Re-Planning
An analysis of the results from the MSIM AOC simulation runs, Figure 7 , showed that for every 10 packages missed, the average time to process any critical targeting event increases by one hour. Our AOC subject matter experts [17] estimated, based on their individual experience, a success rate for strike package formation of between 95% and 98%. On a 500 mission day, that is a miss rate of 2% to 5%, or 10-25 failed packages. Separately, another subject matter expert [18] confirmed that 10 failed packages was conservative. Therefore, given these experiences and analysis results, a minimum increase in process time of 1.0-2.5 hours (1 hour for 10 and 2.5 hours for 25) would be incurred in solving this re-planning problem by the military. 
3 Tanker Utilization
Mission tanker utilization is an important consideration in light of logistical and budget constraints. The Combat Flight Planning Software (CFPS), which was used to plan the routes, includes a detailed flight performance model for each aircraft type, including fuel utilization. However, further simulation modeling via CAPER and Monte Carlo sampling estimated increased flying time beyond the CFPS flight planning, because of delay caused by civilian air traffic congestion. Since the fuel consumption is relatively constant with respect to time (given a particular engine setting), and since most of the flight duration was spent at a cruise setting, we adjusted the fuel consumption computed by CFPS by the ratio of the duration computed by our CAPER/Monte Carlo analysis to the baseline duration computed by CFPS. A comparison of unequipped vs. equipped fuel usage was undertaken, using the null hypothesis:
where: XBAR is the sample mean
Per the t-tests [18] of the null hypothesis resource savings attributable to CNS/ATM capabilities are significant, at the α=0.01 level or better. For example, in examining the results for 2010, (see Figure 8 ) for a mission in the first quarter of the day, the B-52 that lacked FM Immunity required 432,000 lbs of fuel to accomplish its mission, as compared to 264,000 lbs that would be needed if the B-52 were fully equipped and could fly a better route over Europe-a significant savings. This is not surprising, given that the unequipped B-52 had to fly greatly out of its way to avoid the restricted regions. The case for the fighters is less obvious, but the results are likewise significant at the α=0.01 level or better. To put the B-52 2010 case in perspective, a KC-135E tanker operating under ideal conditions (runway, weather, etc.) with a 1500 nm mission radius can offload 55,800 lbs of fuel. The fuel savings attributable to improved CNS/ATM capabilities correspond to approximately 3.1 tanker loads of fuel. This implies a significant savings in terms of required tanker missions when the bases are located in the UK (note: this is a single mission, and not scaled to the 446 missions). 
Summary and Next Steps
The second phase of the CNS ATM Impact Analysis provides a basis for understanding operational impacts through enterprise level analysis that includes Combat Air ForceMobility Air Force interactions, military-civilian interaction, and ripple effects impacting the AOC. The hypotheses that CNS ATM equipment improved mission operations through improved efficiencies were validated. The CNS capabilities analyzed provide significant operational improvement for the scenarios studied. Results included reduced ETA variability and associated waiting times, reduced tanker utilization and fuel expense, improved sortie rates, and improved capability for dynamic tasking at the AOC. Note that fuel expense is a secondary consideration, compared to mission effectiveness.
The impacts attributed to CNS equipage varied with the amount of regulated civilian airspace transited. Given our eastern Mediterranean marshalling point, aircraft based in Southern/Eastern Europe showed less impact than aircraft based in the United Kingdom, which required longer routes through more congested airspace. In that same vein, if airspace usage rules tighten, then the results shown here would get worst; the authors used the current rules published by EUROCONTROL.
These results frequently displayed enterprise trade-off aspects. While these results need to be understood in the context of the assumptions made, the ability to illustrate these trade-offs make this approach useful for enterprise-level analysis. These trade-offs often come disguised as work-arounds. Work-arounds were frequently mentioned in our discussions with military pilots and air traffic controllers.
Work-arounds come at a cost. Current work-arounds, e.g. Altitude Reservations, may not be available in the future, because of shifting political and economic forces. Workarounds can maintain the ability to get to a specific place at a specific time, at least over the short run, but their use may result in a locally optimized solution that is not optimal for the enterprise. An example of this is transiting civilian airspace using less efficient air routing. Fighter platforms can still get to the marshalling point on time, but at the cost of increased tanker use. If more efficient routes could be attained, tanker use could go down resulting in fewer tankers needed-freeing up scarce dollars that could be used elsewhere.
Our model-based analysis framework is maturing and now provides granularity sufficient to investigate individual platforms and using specific CNS ATM capabilities in the context of specific CONOPS through civilian airspace. The data and modeling infrastructure provides added realism, allowing reasonable assumptions and 5-10 year projections. Projections were based on standard sources, especially EUROCONTROL and the Global Access Navigation/Safety CNS/ATM Roadmap. Nearly this entire infrastructure is reusable.
The model-based analysis framework can support enterprise decision processes as noted above. These include developing, expanding, and refining the CNS/ATM roadmap for new capabilities, new platforms, and new scenarios. It also provides a means for addressing specific issues by tailoring problem definitions to specific proposals for funding reductions on the CNS/ATM program. This framework can extend current models for the area of operations by providing added realism for what is now assumed to be unhindered aircraft availability.
Results were presented to the USAF's Global Access, Navigation and Safety (GANS) I-IPT (Integrating-Integrated Product Team) in October 2005. The leadership endorsed the results and recommended additional next steps. Chief among these was the impact analysis of CNS ATM capability on mission training.
This model-based capability will be exercised further in the upcoming year during a third phase. Current plans are to include the assessment of additional CNS ATM capabilities, and assessing the future impact of unattended air systems on NextGeneration Air Traffic Systems, given widespread use by both military and civilian sectors in addition to investigating impacts to training.
